Stuart Hall
Gramsci's Relevance for the Study of Race and Ethnicity I.
The aim of this collection of essaysl is to facilitate &dquo;a more sophisticated examination of the hitherto poorly elucidated phenomena of racism and to examine the adequacy of the theoretical formulations, paradigms and interpretive schemes in the social and human sciences...with respect to introlerance and racism and in relation to the complexity of problems they pose.&dquo; This general rubric enables me to situate more precisely the kind of contribution which a study of Gramsci's work can make to the larger enterprise. In my view, Gramsci's work does not offer a general social science which can be applied to the analysis of social phenomena across a wide comparative range of historical societies. His potential contribution is more limited. It remains, for all that, of seminal importance. His work is, precisely, of a &dquo;sophisticating&dquo; kind. He works, broadly, within the marxist paradigm. However, he has extensively revised, renovated and sophisticated many aspects of that theoretical framework to make it more relevant to contemporary social relations in the twentieth century. His work therefore has a direct bearing on the question of the &dquo;adequacy&dquo; of existing social theories, since it is precisely in the direction of &dquo;complexifying existing theories and problems&dquo; that his most important theoretical contribution is to be found. These points require further clarification before a substantive resume and assessment of Gramsci's theoretical contribution can be offered.
Gramsci was not a &dquo;general theorist.&dquo; Indeed, he did not practice as an academic or scholarly theorist of any kind. From beginning to end, he was and remained a political intellectual and a socialist activist on the Italian political scene. His &dquo;theoretical&dquo; writing was developed out of this more organic engagement with his own society and times and was always intended to serve, not an abstract academic purpose, but the aim of &dquo;informing political practice.&dquo; It is therefore essential not to mistake the level of application at which Gramsci First of all, he argued, one must understand the fundamental structure-the objective relations-within society or &dquo;the degree of development of the productive forces,&dquo; for these set the most fundamental limits and conditions for the whole shape of historical development From here arise some of the major lines of tendency which might be favourable to this or that line of development. The error of reductionism is then to translate these tendencies and constraints immediately into their absolutely determined political and ideological effects; or, alternatively, to abstract them into some &dquo;iron law of necessity.&dquo; In fact, they structure and determine only in the sense that they define the terrain on which historical forces move-they define the horizon of possibilities. But In addition, a class will always have its spontaneous, vivid but not coherent or philosophically elaborated, instinctive understanding of its basic conditions of life and the nature of the constraints and forms of exploitation to which it is commonly subjected. Gramsci described the latter as its &dquo;good sense.&dquo; But it always requires a further work of political education and cultural politics to renovate and clarify these constructions of popular thought &dquo;common sense&dquo;-into a more coherent political theory or philosophical current. This &dquo;raising of popular thought&dquo; is part and parcel of the process by which a collective will is constructed, and requires extensive work of intellectual organization-an essential part of any hegemonic political strategy. Popular beliefs, the culture of a people-Gramsci argues-are not arenas of struggle which can be left to look after themselves. They &dquo;are themselves material forces&dquo; (PN, p. 165).
It thus requires an extensive cultural and ideological struggle to bring about or effect the intellectual and ethical unity which is essential to ihe forging of hegemony: a struggle which takes the form of &dquo;a struggle of political hegemonies and of opposing directions, first in the ethical field and then in that of politics proper&dquo; (PN, p. 333). This bears very directly on the type of social struggles we identify with national, anti-colonial and anti-racist movements. In his application of these ideas, Gramsci is never simplistically &dquo;progressive&dquo; in his approach. For example, he recognizes, in the Italian case, the absence of a genuine popular national culture which could easily provide the groundwork for the formation of a popular collective will. Much of his work on culture, popular literature and religion explores the potential terrain and tendencies in Italian life and society which might provide the basis of such a development He documents, for example, in the Italian case, the extensive degree to which popular Catholicism can and has made itself a genuinely &dquo;popular force,&dquo; giving it a unique importance in forming the traditional conceptions of the popular classes. He attributes this, in part, to Catholicism's scrupulous attention to the organization of ideasespecially to ensuring the relationship between philosophical thought or doctrine and popular life or common sense. Gramsci refuses all notions that ideas move and ideologies develop spontaneously and without direction. Like every other sphere of civil life, religion requires organization: it possesses its specific sites of development, specific processes of transformation, specific practices of struggle. &dquo;The relation between common sense and the upper level of philosophy,&dquo; he asserts, &dquo;is assured by 'polities',&dquo; (PN, p. 331). Major agencies in this process are, of course, the cultural, educational and religious institutions, the family and voluntary associations; but also, political parties, which are also centres of ideological and cultural formation. The principal agents are intellectuals who have a specialized responsibility for the circulation and development of culture and ideology and who either align themselves with the existing dispositions of social and intellectual forces (&dquo;traditional&dquo; intellectuals) or align themselves with the emerging popular forces and seek to elaborate new currents of ideas (&dquo;organic&dquo; intellectuals). Gramsci is eloquent about the critical function, in the Italian case, of traditional intellectuals who have been aligned with classical, scholarly or clerical enterprises, and the relative weakness of the more emergent intellectual strata.
Gramsci's thinking on this question encompasses novel and radical ways of conceptualizing the subjects of ideology, which have become the object of considerable contemporary theorizing. He altogether refuses any idea of a pregiven unified ideological subject-for example, the proletarian with its &dquo;correct&dquo; revolutionary thoughts or blacks with their already guaranteed current anti-racist consciousness. He recognizes the &dquo;plurality&dquo; of selves or identities of which the so-called &dquo;subject&dquo; of thought and ideas is composed. He 
